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Abstract 
This chapter presents network analysis methodologies used in crime and criminal justice 
research and as part of the intelligence analysis process. It starts with the foundations of the 
network analysis of crime in computer science, policing and sociology that have led to the 
‘link analysis’ and the ‘social network analysis’ approaches. It then addresses some of the 
general methodological recommendations, misconceptions and limitations of these 
approaches to analysing criminal networks of offenders. Finally, the contributions of forensic 
science to the reconstruction of crime networks are examined in regard to the potential of 
using traces to infer relationships among actors, the presence of unknown linked entities and 
the identification of their characteristics.  
 
Introduction 
Analysing crime data to detect patterns relies on the ability of practitioners and researchers to 
deconstruct the problem into simple parts. To do so, networks are commonly used as 
convenient models. Two methodologies that are based on graph-like models have merged 
over time: ‘link analysis’ and ‘social network analysis’ (SNA). In this chapter, we start with 
the historical foundations of these approaches, which may be found in computer science, 
policing, sociology and legal science. As a descriptive model, networks are more often than 
not used to model criminal networks of offenders, but practices and research have proven that 
their scope may be broadened. We therefore discuss some ideas and misconceptions about 
their uses and present some general methodological recommendations. Finally, the 
contributions of forensic science to reconstructing crime networks are examined in regard to 
the potential of using traces to infer relationships among actors, the presence of unknown 
linked entities, and the identification of their characteristics. 
 
The Network Dimension of Crime 
Networks as models to describe and analyse crime or deviant activities are based on the root 
principle that such activities can be modelled by a graph of entities connected by 
relationships. This model aims to detect, collate and interpret the ties between relevant entities 
(e.g., persons, events, locations). It supports the reconstruction of a criminal activity that may 
involve a complex set of individuals and events and the inference of the roles or influences of 
a network structure to the realization of a criminal activity. Networks, like other models, are 
used to facilitate the analysis of complex problems. Formalized by Chen (1976), the entity-
relationship model offers a unified and natural view of the real world. He defines an entity ‘as 
a “thing” which can be distinctly identified and relationships are associations among entities’ 
(Chen 1976, 10). An entity is thus a thing having a separate and identifiable existence.  
 
This model was published nearly at the same time as Harper and Harris’s (1975) paper, which 
defines ‘link analysis’ as the core method for criminal intelligence analysis in policing. They 
attribute the earliest application of the approach—in engineering—to Gilberth and Gilberth 
(1917) (cited in Harper and Harris 1975) and they suggest its application to describe 
organized crime problems. The link analysis approach is a qualitative method to describe 
organized crime structures with nodes and edges. In fact, graph-based techniques have been 
exploited since the nineteenth century to model data gathered during an investigation. They 
can be found in the work of John Henry Wigmore, whose method inspired the argument 
diagramming in which nodes represent facts and assumptions linked with causal relationships 
(Wigmore 1913). 
 
Akin to the link analysis framework is the concept of social network, which, in the social 
sciences, is defined as ‘a set of socially relevant nodes connected by one or more relations’ 
(Marin and Wellman 2011, 11). Individuals and organizations are the most common classes of 
entities analysed in the social network approach. The concepts of ‘nodes’, ‘actors’ or ‘entities’ 
are often used as synonyms. Here we use the concept of ‘entity’ as a distinctly identified part 
of the reality (e.g., a person, an event or a location) and the notion of ‘node’ as its 
representation in the network model. The social network approach aims at modelling and 
studying patterns of relationships between entities and not only their characteristics. ‘The unit 
of analysis in network analysis is not the individual, but an entity consisting of a collection of 
individuals and the linkages among them’ (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 5). A network, by 
itself, is thus an entity embedding a set of interconnected entities. But networks are not the 
same as groups (Marin and Wellman 2011), which are classifications of a particular type of 
thing in a common set or a particular discrete group membership. The social network 
approach is thus a particular modelling process where an object of study is defined with an 
entity-relationship model to describe the social phenomena. 
 
General overviews of social network analysis, such as Marin and Wellman (2011) and 
Wasserman and Faust (1994) classify the exploitation of the network model in two main 
categories. For a recent review of the multiple contributions of SNA to criminology, see 
Bouchard and Malm (2016). On the one hand, a network can be considered as a dependent 
variable, which may be explained by a theory of causation. On the other hand, it may be 
considered as the independent variable leading to a particular phenomenon. In this latter 
scenario, the social network approach is based on the hypothesis that causation is attributable 
to social structures and not located in the traditional individual attributes that have formed the 
basis of social science explanatory models. Thus, the roots of criminal activities may be 
explained by the relationships between social entities (e.g., personal relationships, 
opportunities or community settings) and not solely by their intrinsic attributes (e.g., gender 
or age): ‘More than a set of methods—it is an orientation toward the understanding of human 
behaviour that focuses on the importance of social relations and their consequence’ (McGloin 
and Kirk 2010, 210). From a formal perspective, modern social networks find their origins in 
anthropology and sociology, in particular in the sociometric models pioneered by Jacob L. 
Moreno and Helen Jennings (Jennings 1943; Moreno 1932 and 1934; see Freeman 2004 for a 
historical overview of their collaborative work). This approach relies on a network model 
combined with the use of mathematical measures describing the global structure of the 
network or the structural importance of its nodes. 
 
In criminology, the network model has been used both to describe (as a dependent variable) 
and to explain (as an independent variable) crime (Papachristos 2011, 2014). McGloin and 
Kirk (2010) and Carrington (2011) state that the social network approach is at the crossroads 
between Sutherland’s differential association theory and Hirschi’s social control theory. 
Social networks are seen as a key predicator of crime: ‘one of the most robust findings in the 
field of criminology, namely that the bulk of delinquency is carried out in groups’ (McGloin 
and Kirk 2010, 209). Sutherland (1939) formulated that criminal behaviours, rationalizations 
and attitudes are learned in the context of overly positive associations with offenders. This 
was extended into Akers learning theory (1998); he proposed a social structure model to 
categorize the factors influencing deviant actions: the social organization or community, the 
socio-demographic characteristics of individuals and groups, the social disorganization or 
group conflict and, finally, the social location in groups. It is this latter social structure that is 
typically modelled by a network approach. Carrington (2011) argues that both Sutherland’s 
differential association theory and Hirschi’s social control theory can be interpreted and tested 
with network models at a micro-level (i.e., the ego network of an individual). Furthermore, 
the network approach can also be applied to the macro-level of communities or 
neighbourhoods in relation to social disorganization theory (see Carrington 2011) or even at 
the country level (see Boivin 2014). A social network approach can also integrate an analysis 
of individual’s attributes, such as age and genre. One of the main concepts from this 
perspective is homophily, which refers to individuals in the same social network sharing 
similar demographic characteristics (Van Mastrigt and Carrington 2014; McPherson et al. 
2001). In addition, Papachristos (2011) links the social network approach to opportunity 
theories, in the sense that ‘everyday life is structured by peer groups and the availability of 
behavioural options in the group’ (117). The assumption is that the network dimension of 
criminal activities generates opportunities (Morselli 2009). For instance, the social network 
approach may be combined with a geographical analysis through the analysis of the ‘journey 
to associates’ (Malm et al. 2008). Papachristos (2014) promotes the concept of ‘social space’ 
to describe how neighbourhoods and communities are more than just geographic concepts but 
are also related to the network dimension of crime. 
 
As a descriptive model, social networks are more often than not used to model criminal 
networks of individuals involved in a shared illicit activity. Much research on criminal 
networks does not focus on the aetiology of crime but rather on the description of the 
organization of a particular subgroup of individuals. The criminal network as an object of 
study leads to such questions as how to detect, to describe and to measure the regularities and 
patterns of social structures. Papachristos (2011) even argues that methods within the social 
network analysis repertoire could move past the descriptive model to the understanding of the 
generative processes or aetiology of criminal groups.  
 
Analysing Criminal Networks 
Analysing crime problems by their network dimension is commonly associated with the 
analysis of organized criminal networks to support criminal investigations that aim at 
developing disruption strategies (Strang 2014). Indeed, the use of link charts has emerged in 
criminal intelligence analysis as an investigative tool to structure information gathered during 
an investigation and to reconstruct the network of organized criminal groups (Harper and 
Harris 1975). Social network analysis methods have then been proposed to enrich the 
approach by the use of centrality metrics (Klerks 2001; Sparrow 1991). This has led to a 
narrow view of the overall scope of approaches. In this section, we discuss some ideas and 
misconceptions about their uses for both practical and research purposes. 
 
Summarizing network analytic techniques as the description and analysis of complex 
organized criminal groups is an oversimplification. Indeed, for the last 20 years, many 
researchers have shown how these techniques can support the analysis of a broader range of 
crime problems and many lines of questioning. Extant research has shown that co-offending 
generally involves small groups that are not stable in time, which is contrary to the 
assumption that criminal groups are more often than not hierarchically structured (Hashimi et 
al. 2016; Morselli 2009; Reuter 1983). Indeed, the size of a network may be positively 
associated with the probability of detection. Small, flexible and ephemeral groups may be 
hypothetically more resilient (Reuter 1983). Research has shown that co-offending groups are 
not stable and are generally composed of two or three co-offenders (Hashimi et al. 2016). 
Duijn et al. (2014) show that criminal groups are often not characterized by a stable 
hierarchical structure but rather by a flexible organization. The more ways or paths a network 
has to achieve its goal, the more flexible and resilient it is to law enforcement actions against 
its actors (Morselli and Roy 2008). The flexibility of a network is related to its self-organizing 
capacities that result from its creation process. It relies on the development of interactions 
between the multiple relationships that each actor of the network has (Morselli, 2009). This is 
the snowball effect described by Kleemans (2007).  
 
It should be noted that the flexibility of a network as a core characteristic of its resilience does 
not necessarily imply that central actors are absent. Some actors may lead the activities or 
play a strategic intermediary role between unlinked actors. As key middlemen, known as 
brokers, they are said to control the flow of information and make others dependent on their 
activities (Freeman 1977). The key role of brokers has been studied in many areas, such as 
drug trafficking (Desroches 2005; Natarajan 2006; Pearson and Hobbs 2001; Zaitch 2002), 
illicit markets (Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004; Morselli and Roy 2008) and human trafficking 
(Kleemans 2007; Zhang 2008; Zhang and Chin 2002). They may spread the flexibility of the 
networks by their ability to contact several co-offenders to perform a specific task, thus 
increasing opportunities. It is worth noting that the key role of an actor may be unrelated to its 
direct centrality and more related to its functional roles within the criminal activity. The roles 
of actors are thus a key element in analysing criminal networks, leading to new frameworks 
for combining social network and script analysis (Bright et al. 2014; Morselli and Roy 2008).  
 
The detection of central actors may serve to disrupt the functioning of a network by 
neutralizing key actors. But the examination of criminal networks may also aim at analysing 
the formation, composition and functioning of co-offending groups whether or not they are 
well structured (McGloin and Nguyen 2014). The focus is placed on the way criminal groups 
emerged and grew to settle prevention strategies: ‘the goal is not to dismantle a network but 
rather to prevent it from occurring in the first place’ (McGloin and Nguyen 2014, 20). 
Network analytic techniques may thus support the comparison of structures of multiple 
criminal groups and the analysis of their differences and similarities. They allow the 
evaluation of the roles of several sources of information to the reconstruction of criminal 
networks and how these sources influence their perception (Corazza and Esseiva 2013). In 
policing, they are key technics used to structure the information gathered during an 
investigation and facilitate the analysis of a case. As an external aid, they support 
collaborative thinking and support joint decision-making processes (Rossy and Ribaux 2014). 
Finally, they may also support the evaluation of disruption strategies in regard to their impact 
on the structure of criminal groups. 
 Methodological Elements  
To analyse crime from its network dimension, graph-based techniques are more often than not 
used to model the problem. They can be classified into two main methodological categories. 
First, link analysis relies on the drawing of a qualitative graph depicting relationships between 
several types of entities by using adequate visual properties of nodes and edges (or links). 
Second, social network analysis uses a simpler visual model of nodes and edges but extends 
the model with quantitative measures depicting the structure of the global network or the 
structural features of its nodes. In this section, we present the aims, key concepts and 
methodological aspects of each. 
 
Link Analysis 
Link analysis is based on the conception of graph-like charts that aim to describe crime 
problems with a network model of nodes representing entities of interest such as persons, 
objects, traces, events or location, and their relationships. Link charts are used in criminal 
investigations to facilitate the processing of large-scale investigation data. They are 
commonly used to memorize the collected data and keep an overview of the relevant 
information. As working memory, they support investigators to remember the elements of the 
case and facilitate communication within teams or with partners. Even if they are not 
completely independent of language, link charts are generally well understood in international 
inquiries. When well designed, they are intuitive and do not require the mastery of complex 
formalism. In addition, the overview offered by link charts is generally highly appreciated by 
managers within police and criminal intelligence organizations. 
 
The conception of link charts implies the adherence to some general recommendations. Some 
are found repeatedly in criminal analysis textbooks (Fedpol 2010; Interpol 1997; UNODC 
2002) and the scientific literature (Harper and Harris 1975; Morris 1986; Senator 2005). For 
instance, ‘minimizing edge crossings’ and ‘favouring orthogonally’ to improve the readability 
of the chart are repeatedly promoted. Global methodology and a review of these 
recommendations can be found in Rossy and Ribaux (2014) and Rossy (2016). 
 
Traditionally, these graph-like techniques are used for the representation of criminal 
networks, smuggling of goods, chronologies of events, as well as the visualization of 
telephone records and financial data. In this context, visualizations are used for many 
objectives, such as analysing the traces and information gathered, evaluating a cold-case, 
helping along the categorization of a particular offence, facilitating the transmission and 
receipt of a case or supporting an argument at trial (Rossy and Ribaux 2014). The 
identification of recurrent forms of usage in regard to repetitive crime and investigative 
problems has led to the formalization of patterns of visualizations. They are formalized to 
describe a design framework defined by the problem. Traditional link chart patterns are (1) 
the criminal network chart; (2) the chart of a trafficking action-set; (3) the event chart; and (4) 
the chart of a series. The first two support investigations involving the reconstruction of 
criminal groups. The latter two are intended to support the reconstruction process of complex 
criminal events whether a single case or a sequence of cases. A complete description of these 
patterns can be found in Rossy (2016). 
 
The identification of patterns in link charts aims at formalizing adequate visual 
representations to support decision-making. Without cumulative experience, effort and time 
may be required to design an effective chart (Innes et al. 2005). Indeed, the design of a link 
chart is based on the understanding of the problem addressed by the analyst and his/her ability 
to model it in the form of a network representation (Peterson et al. 2000). The quality of the 
representation is then dependent on the analyst’s ability to identify and classify entities and 
relationships relevant to the investigation and to distinguish them from those that may be 
omitted. The design involves both an ability to produce an expressive visual structure and an 
ability to properly model the situations encountered. Some authors note that a link chart does 
not solve the problem of information overload (Klerks 2001; Schroeder et al. 2007). Indeed, 
link charts seem to work well when the number of entities and relationships represented is 
limited. Moreover, if visualizations provide many benefits, they are not neutral and may 
induce biases. Designer choices, whether intentional or not, and user induced effects (e.g., 
confusion, distraction or misinterpretation) are two frequent causes of bias (Bresciani and 
Eppler 2009). For instance, the designer may oversimplify the problem and leave aside crucial 
elements that may lead to ambiguities and interpretation mistakes (Rossy and Ribaux 2012). 
This kind of bias may feed rhetoric in court.  
 
However, these methods continue to be exploited and seem to respond to concrete needs. 
They allow for a common support to managing a large amount of heterogeneous data and they 
facilitate both the analysis and communication of information. The visual language is 
sufficiently rich and expressive to integrate the diversity of concepts encountered during the 
analysis of a criminal activity. 
 
Social Network Analysis 
Social network analysis is based on a simpler network model usually consisting of one set of 
social entities. Usually nodes depict individuals, but they may also represent groups of 
individuals or moral persons such as companies. Relationships among such actors are then 
depicted by edges between the nodes. This form of social network is known as a one-mode 
network. Analyses may also be derived from two-mode network data (i.e., two types of 
nodes) by extracting relations that consist of co-membership or affiliation to a group or co-
attendance to an event. The number of types represented by nodes on a social network is the 
main feature that distinguishes it from a link chart. More often than not, a one-mode approach 
is used (Borgatti 2012; Strang 2014). On a link chart, the number of types of entities 
represented is not limited in the model, but defined by the criminal activity and chosen in 
consistency with the investigative questions. 
 
The key methodological aspect of social networks is the integration of quantitative measures 
to depict the structure of the global network or the structural importance of specific nodes. 
The first category of methods, known as first order metrics, aims to describe the network as a 
whole. Among others, classical measures are the size of the network, its density, averaged 
degree, average shortest path (geodesic), and degree or betweenness centralization. The size 
of a network is calculated in terms of the number of nodes or links. The density is a measure 
of network cohesion, which accounts for the proportion of ties to all possible ties. A network 
containing all possible links is called a clique. The average degree is the mean of the number 
of links per node, and the average geodesic describes how far apart any two given nodes are 
(i.e., the average number of intermediates between two nodes). Degree and betweenness 
centralization describe the amount of variation in degree and betweenness scores for each 
node of the network (see below). These four calculations are often used to compare the value 
of a specific node to the average value of all nodes in the whole network. They are based on 
metrics that aim to describe the centrality of the nodes within a network. Such calculations are 
known as second order metrics or ‘centrality measures’. Classical measures are degree, 
closeness, betweenness and eigenvector centralities. Additional indicators have been 
developed and classified into three types of measures: local, distance and feedback (Brandes 
and Erlebach 2005).1  
 
Since centrality may come in many forms, the centrality metrics aim at distinguishing them. 
Degree (i.e., the number of direct links with other nodes) and closeness (i.e., the shortest 
distance between a particular node and all other nodes) centrality measures aim to detect 
whether one individual could be central because he or she has many contacts. Others may 
have few contacts, but remain central because they link unconnected entities. The 
betweenness measure (i.e., the number of times a node lies on the shortest path between two 
other nodes) and eigenvector measure (i.e., the degree to which an individual is connected to 
other highly connected individuals) aim to detect these intermediaries or related roles. The 
interpretation of the metrics is an unresolved problem. Sparrow (1991) argued that it is a sign 
of strength, whereas Peterson (1994) sees a high degree of centrality as a vulnerability (see 
Morselli 2010 for an assessment within crime contexts). But no matter how they are 
interpreted, centrality measures allow discrimination of nodes and the detection of particular 
nodes that may have specific or abnormal activity within the network. They allow a 
quantitative description that may support the examination of the evolution of the network and 
the comparison of multiple networks. More specifically, social networks support (1) the 
detection of central individuals or subgroups in a criminal network; (2) the identification of 
their interactions; (3) the description of the structure of the network; (4) the evaluation of the 
impact of removing an individual from the network; and, finally, (5) the analysis of a 
network’s information flows (Morselli et al. 2013). Researchers, however, have to be cautious 
of the limitations of the approach. Indeed, the reconstruction of co-offending networks often 
fails to integrate the social environment of offenders and relies on abilities to detect crimes. 
The perception of the networks is highly influenced by the efforts taken to reconstruct them 
(Bouchard and Malm 2016). As described below, these challenges are common to both 
methods. 
 Common Challenges of Conception 
The conception process of both link charts and social network graphs relies on key 
considerations. The first is known as the boundary specification problem (Laumann et al. 
1992). Whatever the problem being addressed, it is necessary to realize that the information 
gathered and its network model may be incomplete and reflect only one part of the whole 
picture. Analysing a whole network requires one to consider all connected nodes. Such an 
analysis is based on the assumption that the knowledge gathered is sufficient to describe the 
network as a whole. This is often not the case, and the classical way to address this problem is 
to clearly specify its delimitation. One way is to analyse an egocentric network dataset that 
focuses on the nodes surrounding one node known as the ego. Alternatively, a set of preset 
nodes may be selected. For instance, this is the case when an investigator analyses the 
telephone record data of the suspects in an investigation. However, even if several nodes are 
used as ego, this conception process leads to a bias. Indeed, the ego will naturally be central. 
This process is typical during investigations (Sparrow 1991). Laumann et al. (1992) identify 
three approaches to addressing this boundary specification problem: (1) considering those 
entities that are members of a known group, such as the members of an organization; (2) 
defining the population by limiting the entities to those involved in an event or a series of 
events; (3) selecting the entities based on a particular type of relationship. The conception 
process must thus be documented and the incompleteness in data should be well documented. 
Relevant entities and relationships must be selectively chosen leaving out the rest. The 
definition and the selection of the relevant entities rely on a clear definition of the aims of the 
analysis and the decisions it has to support. 
 
The second consideration to address is how to handle uncertainties. They must be clearly 
identified and expressed in the model. Uncertainty can take several forms in a network. In 
particular, it may be unclear whether two entities are distinct. One physical person may, for 
instance, have multiple aliases not identified as related to the same entity. A link between two 
entities may also be uncertain. On a link chart it is common to distinguish unconfirmed links 
by dashed-lines. Uncertainties may also be handled with probabilities attached to the links and 
integrated in centrality measures as well as with simulation-based methods (Adar and Re 
2007; Svenson 2008). Moreover, a distinction must be made between facts and hypotheses. 
This distinction is at the core of the investigation and the research processes, which aim at 
identifying the causes (i.e., the hypotheses) of the observed effects (i.e., the facts). 
 
Finally, a key element of the conception is to clearly define the nature of the entities and the 
relationships involved (Rossy and Ribaux 2014). Indeed, a network model aims at analysing 
the relationships among entities, while also understanding their nature and roles, in order to 
reconstruct the network. Consequently, the nature and characteristics of the relationships must 
be described as well as their frequency and uncertainty. Relations may be observed or 
measured, binary or valued. They may also be directed or undirected. The type of relation 
may be directly defined by its nature, such as co-membership to a group that is undirected or a 
sale of goods that is directed. However, the definition of the relationships may also imply 
making a decision in regard to the available data (Marin and Wellman 2011). For instance, 
Borgatti et al. (2009) identify four main categories of relations: similarities (e.g., a shared 
attribute), social relations (e.g., affective ties, friendships), interactions (e.g., participation in 
an event) and flows (e.g., an exchange or transfer between nodes). Since network analytical 
techniques aim at analysing the relationships between the entities, the data source underlying 
their detection and the formalism used to describe them should be well documented. 
 
The Role of Forensic Science: Traces in the Reconstruction of Networks 
In this section we discuss the roles of traces in reconstructing criminal activities within a 
network model of crime where they can take the form of relationships or entities. On the one 
hand, and as Locard’s principle of exchange states, traces can be used to infer links between 
entities of interest such as individuals, locations and events. On the other hand, they may be 
used to infer the presence of a particular entity, such as a person or an object, based on Kirk’s 
principle of individualization; the presence of a set of entities; or to provide information about 
the nature of the entity of interest through its identification (i.e., the definition of its class).  
 
Locard’s principle of exchange defines the trace as the result of a transfer during a particular 
abnormal activity (i.e., a crime, a deviant or illicit activity). In regard to the entity-relationship 
model, a trace can be considered as an entity. It has its own distinctive existence, for example, 
a bloodstain or a shoemark. The trace as an entity is an observable and collectable pattern, 
signal or material that has its own existence and results from an activity of interest in a 
particular environment.  
 
Of particular interest to the reconstruction of a criminal network is the fact that a trace is also 
the sign of the presence of one or more related entities in the network. Even if the identity of 
the source of the trace is unknown, the trace’s presence is the sign of the activity of one or 
more individuals. For instance, DNA profiles extracted from biological traces may be used to 
infer the presence of an offender. A network of offenders can thus combine both known and 
unknown persons based on the traces they left during crimes. As Kirk’s principle states, 
forensic science relies on the process of individualization that aims to infer the unique source 
(i.e., a person, an object or a material) of a detected trace (Kirk 1963; Margot 2011). The 
process relies on the detection of characteristics within the trace, which lead to the 
discrimination of a particular entity among all the other possible sources. For instance, event 
A is committed by offender A and crime B by offender B. Both are linked by the same DNA 
profile, which does not belong to A or B. In such a case, a network of three offenders can be 
inferred: A is linked to an unknown offender, which is linked to B. Whether or not the source 
of the trace is known, its existence may be the sign of the presence of a related, distinctly 
identified source entity. This unknown entity may be defined as a ‘virtual entity’ or more 
specifically as a ‘virtual person’ in the case of a DNA profile. A virtual entity is an abstract 
entity (i.e., a node in a network model) with a unique identity that may be related to one or 
more physical or digital entities (Jaquet-Chiffelle et al. 2009, 2008). For instance, the DNA 
profile of a trace is the identity of a virtual person that may be a unique individual or twins. A 
broad variety of traces can be used to infer the presence of virtual entities or, more 
specifically, virtual persons, in networks even if their roles are not identified. For instance, if 
two drug seizures are linked by forensic profiling, one may infer a common activity of an 
individual (or a group of individuals) that can be modelled and integrated in the network as an 
unidentified virtual entity (Corazza and Esseiva 2013). Such hypotheses can then be evaluated 
in regard to other sources of information collected during the investigation. In a network 
model of a criminal activity, one trace can thus be used to infer the presence of one or more 
virtual entities, which may be related to a specific physical entity or to several.  
 
Traces can also be used to infer some specific characteristics of an unknown entity or 
offender. A trace can indeed be used to define the class of an entity. For instance, the gender 
of an offender can be detected from a biological trace, or an unknown powder may become an 
identified illicit drug. This is the process known as the identification of an entity. A trace can 
thus be used in a network as a partial identifier (i.e., an identity-related information) (Jaquet-
Chiffelle et al. 2008). In this case, the trace is not the sign of the presence of a specific, fully 
identified entity but of a ‘frame’ of entities. The concept of frame defined by Kind (1987, 
1994) referred to the set of persons of interest or entities of interest during an investigation. 
More broadly defined, it is the set of entities that matches the identity-related information. 
 
A trace can also be interpreted as a tie between involved entities, commonly the source entity 
that produces it and the substrate entity where it was left during the event. Traces can link 
involved entities in both directions, as the principle of exchange states. For instance, a stain 
mark resulting from an assault can link a particular individual to the victim. But a trace as a 
tie may also link multiple entities, such as an email involving more than two email addresses 
that may be linked to several individuals. A stain mark containing a mixture of several DNA 
profiles can be associated with two or more individuals. In a network model of criminal 
activity, one trace can thus be used to infer one or more relationships among entities. The 
trace as a relationship is an observable and collectable tie, resulting from an activity of 
interest in a particular environment, between two or more entities.  
 
A trace can thus link many types of entities, but the reconstruction of criminal networks aims 
at the identification of links between individuals. In these regards, traces may be used as 
direct links when the source of the trace is a person, or as indirect links when the source is an 
object. The relationship may also involve several types of entities such as a link between an 
individual and an event or a link to a location. Such links are of particular interest in 
reconstructing a two-mode network or a link chart of the criminal activity. Traces as a 
relationship can thus be classified according to the types of entities involved: 
1) A relationship between individuals: a stain mark of an offender found on a victim or a 
mixture of DNA profiles found at the crime scene linking multiple offenders. 
2) A relationship through objects: the trace is a sign of a transaction such as a telephone 
call, an email or bank transfer that is commonly used by criminal intelligence analysts 
to reconstruct networks of offenders. The trace is the result of an activity involving 
several types of entities such as mobile phones, bank accounts or computers. To infer 
a link between offenders, their relationships to the objects used should be evaluated. 
3) A relationship to an event: the trace is a sign of an activity such as gunshot residues 
resulting from the use of a firearm or glass fragments resulting from a glass breakage. 
Situating traces in time is a key aspect to inferring a link between a relevant entity and 
a particular event. Such links may be reconstructed by the use of direct markers of 
time (such as a digital record), ageing techniques or reconstructing chronologies 
(Weyermann and Ribaux 2012). 
4) A relationship to a location: the trace is a sign of the presence of the offender such as 
stain marks, fingerprints or shoemarks detected at a specific location. Traces linked to 
the location such as soil, fibre or glass microtraces may also be recovered on a suspect. 
Records of digital traces are also used to link an individual to a location with geocoded 
databases (e.g., the geocoded cell of a mobile phone call, the record of a GPS signal or 
a geocoded IP address). 
 
A single trace can thus be considered as a sign of a relationship between two or more entities 
of interest in a network model. But the comparison of two or more traces detected on several 
events can also serve the detection of multiple forms of relationships among events. This 
forensic link is defined as ‘a relationship established between forensic science entities sharing 
similar features that stems from the hypothesis of a common cause’ (Baechler et al. 2015, 
186). The common cause is the most plausible explanation of the observed similarity (Cleland 
2013). It is often a unique source entity such as an individual or an object or a similarity of 
actions such as a modus operandi reconstructed by the observation of traces (Baechler et al. 
2015). Forensic links can be classified according to the nature of the inference involved. 
Several hypotheses about the common cause may indeed be inferred (for more details, see 
Ribaux et al. 2006). If two biological traces share the same DNA profile, one may infer a 
unique person as the source of both traces. In this case, traces may link a distinctly identified 
entity such as a person or an object. The link may also be less specific. For instance, if two 
shoemarks shared the same pattern, one may infer the presence of a frame of entities (i.e., the 
same type of objects). The detection of forensic links is at the core of the forensic intelligence 
process, which covers a broad range of exploitation of forensic science in policing (see 
Ribaux and Caneppele ‘Forensic Intelligence’, in this volume). The use of forensic case data 
to reconstruct criminal networks is one form of exploitation of the informative value of traces 
in the field of knowledge known as forensic intelligence (Ribaux 2014; Ribaux and Talbot 
Wright 2014). In a network model, forensic links may link two or more events.  
 
Traces can thus be integrated in a network model of criminal activities as relationships 
between entities of interest or to infer the presence of one or more entities from the profile of 
the trace itself. They may also serve the identification of the type of an entity. When multiple 
traces are considered, a forensic link between two or more events may be inferred. It takes the 
form of a virtual entity describing a common source. The profile of the trace defines the 
identity of the virtual entity, which may be linked to one physical or digital entity of the real 
world or a frame of entities (see Table 17.1 for a summary). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16.1 The roles of forensic case data in a network model of criminal activities  
Network model Physical/digital world Examples 
A trace to infer the 
presence of one or 
more virtual 
entities 
A virtual entity* - An object or a person 
- A set of objects/persons 
sharing the same virtual 
identity 
A fingerprint of a person 
A DNA profile of twins, an 
email or an IP address 
Multiple virtual 
entities 
- A set of distinctly identified 
objects or persons 
A DNA mixture 
An identity-related 
information of a 
virtual entity 
- A frame of objects or 
persons 
 
- A modus operandi of an 
event 
A partial DNA profile, a 
shoe-mark’s pattern 
A drug synthesis method, 
a website conception  
A trace to infer 
relationships 
among virtual 
entities 
A relationship** 
between individuals 
- A direct link between two 
or more persons 
A stain mark of an 
offender found on a 
victim, a DNA mixture 
An indirect 
relationship 
through objects 
- An indirect link between 
two or more persons 
through the use of objects 
A telephone call, an email, 
a bank transfer 
A relationship to an 
event 
- A link between an 
object/person and an 
event 
A gunshot residue, some 
glass fragments, a time 
stamp of a file 
A relationship to a 
location 
- A link between an 
object/person and a 
location 
A soil trace, a GSP record 
Two or more 
traces to infer the 
presence of one or 
more virtual 
entities 
A same virtual 
entity 
- An object or a person as a 
source entity 
 
A same DNA profile, a 
same shoe or tire mark 
A same identity-
related information 
of a virtual entity 
- A frame of objects or 
persons 
- A modus operandi of an 
event 
The model of an object 
A drug synthesis method, 
a website conception 
* In a network model, a virtual entity refers to a node  
** In a network model, a relationship refers to an edge between two nodes or multiple edges between 
more than two nodes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, decades of research have demonstrated the potential of the network perspective 
to analyse crime phenomena, and thousands of intelligence analysts are using link analysis 
and SNA methods, all around the globe, to manage the flow of information they must handle 
in real cases and to infer the activities of offenders. The entity-relationship model seems to 
complete and complement the geospatial and temporal dimensions of analysis of crime and 
supports both qualitative and quantitative research. Nevertheless, analysts and researchers 
should be cautious about the pitfalls and limitations of these approaches. These limitations are 
promoted by ‘what you see is what you get’ technologies, which hide challenges and 
methodological rules. 
 
The growth of (digital) data collated during an analysis raises the temptation to jump to the 
use of the technical/technological, whereas the first step of any analysis is the careful 
evaluation of the objectives and the evaluation of the quality of the information at hand. This 
is one of the root principles of any scientific inquiry and this is where the trace may play a 
critical role. We have shown in this chapter how traces—whether they are physical or 
digital—as the most direct remnant of any criminal activity  can be used to reconstruct 
criminal networks. Both link analysis and social network analysis approaches constitute a 
promising venture for forensic scientists and criminologists to collaborate around a shared 
model that supports the analysis and the integration of multiple sources of information to 
detect patterns in crime data. 
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